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Abstract
In the scope of corporations, information and knowledge management are essential prac-
tices that are carried out through information systems. In this chapter, we discuss the 
foundations of an ontological-based architecture for organizing information and knowl-
edge within corporations. Our research focus on three main efforts: (i) to shed some light 
on the ontological status of corporations, (ii) to understand the relations between cor-
porate units, and (iii) to approach the duties that corporations have to manage. After 
presenting background theories, we analyze the corporation through two dimensions, 
namely, a descriptive and a normative. While the former approaches the structure of 
the corporation from the point of view of its units, the latter approaches it from the 
point of view of duties and obligations. The descriptive side of our investigation is con-
ducted through principles of top-level formal ontologies; the normative side is addressed 
through the so-called social ontology. The relevance of developing such analysis rests on 
the need of a better understanding of corporations, its structures, and its activities. Such 
insight can provide a formal framework suitable to be applied in information systems, 
working in the context of modern technologies like the Semantic Web.
Keywords: corporation, ontology, theory of corporation, knowledge management
1. Introduction
In recent years, corporations have made significant investments in information and knowl-
edge management initiatives mainly through the development of information systems. 
Among the many techniques utilized for this end, ontologies are an alternative that have 
received an increased amount of attention [1–3].
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Ontology is a term originated in Philosophy also employed to describe a hierarchical struc-
ture composed by entities and relations for purposes of representation. The issue of defin-
ing ontologies lies on the fact that different research communities have adopted different 
perspectives: Computer Science, for example, Artificial Intelligence, Databases, and Software 
Engineering; Library and Information Science; and Logic and Philosophy, to mention but 
a few [4].
A diversity of initiatives for using ontologies in corporations can be found in the literature 
since the 1990s [5–8]. However, the research on ontologies lacks an applied ontology approach 
for corporations that mirror two main applications of ontologies: ontology as an inventory of 
entities for information systems modeling and ontology as a formal theory for purposes of 
automatic reasoning. This chapter presents an ongoing research that seeks to cover this gap. 
At this point of our ongoing research, we focus on three efforts: (i) to shed some light on the 
ontological status of corporations, (ii) to understand the relations between corporative units, 
and (iii) to approach the duties that a corporation has to manage.
In order to reach our purposes, we first present a background of formal theories and doc-
trines of the nature of corporation. Subsequently, we provide an analysis of the corporation 
through two dimensions, namely, a descriptive and a normative. In the descriptive dimension, 
we approach the structure of the corporation from the point of view of units and subunits; in 
the normative dimension, we approach the structure of the corporation from the point of view 
of its rights, duties, and obligations. In the descriptive side of our investigation, we employ 
principles and notions of top-level formal ontologies; in the normative side, we make use the 
so-called social ontology approach, including theories of social acts, speech acts, and docu-
ment acts.
We believe in the relevance of developing this kind of analysis in order to improve the under-
standing of both corporations and the activities that take place within them. We also can 
provide a formal framework to be applied in the context of modern technologies like the 
Semantic Web. In addition, an ontological theory for corporations can be the basis for archi-
tecture for organizing information and knowledge within corporations, allowing the integra-
tion and coordination of the extensive variety of information systems in charge of corporate 
procedures.
The remaining part of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some introduc-
tory background; Section 3 presents an overview of the main doctrines, legal and economic, 
about the nature of corporations; Section 4 addresses corporations through an ontological 
analysis; Section 5 discusses our findings; and finally, Section 6 presents our final remarks and 
prospects for future research.
2. Background
In order to properly understand our organization of entities that compose a corporation from 
an ontological point of view, we need to explain essentials of some subjects. This section 
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brings those explanations organized as follows: Section 2.1 explains the basic of the discipline 
of ontology; Section 2.2 explains formal ontology and top-level ontology; Section 2.3 briefly 
presents ontological theories related with whole and parts; and finally, Section 2.4 deals with 
essentials of the social ontology.
2.1. Essentials of ontology
Ontology is a term that assumes diverse connotations in different scientific fields like 
Philosophy, Computer Science, and Library and Information Science.
In Philosophy, ontology is a branch of Metaphysics, which includes notions of being, iden-
tity, change over time, dependency, quality, and so forth. Systems of categories structured 
in hierarchical levels are the most important topic to be studied in any ontological approach. 
There are several philosophical systems of categories developed since ancient times, but new 
systems have been introduced in the last 50 years, for example, see [9–12].
It is worth mentioning a relevant distinction about ontology within Philosophy, which is not 
always apparent, but is important for our purposes here. The term ontology, in general, refers 
to which one could call “natural ontology.” Such a natural ontology corresponds to an exhaus-
tive classification of natural types and relations by which entities are tied together. When one 
says “natural types,” she should not consider the realm of artifacts created by humans [13]. 
In contrast, there is another philosophical approach one can call the ontology of the social 
reality, or “social ontology,” which deals with the full range of human artifacts and social 
devices, for example, money, property, governments, nations, marriages, and so forth [14].
In Computer and Information Science, two senses for the term ontology are considered the most 
important: (i) the use of ontological principles to understand and represent reality, as support 
to modeling activities [15] and (ii) the representation of a domain of knowledge through a 
formal language to be processed by automatic reasoners [16]. In the former application, ontol-
ogy is aligned with its original role of providing an account of reality; in the latter application, 
it corresponds to a software engineering artifact.
As a result of the current widespread prevalence of digital resources, new category systems 
for knowledge representational have been developed to meet specific goals of modeling, 
automatic reasoning, and information retrieval. The most currently referenced systems are 
DOLCE, which stands for Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering [17], and 
BFO, which stands for Basic Formal Ontology [18]. This kind of category system, in general is 
called as top-level ontology, conveys the two senses of the term ontology: they are computa-
tional artifacts founded in philosophical theories specified in a formal language.
In the context of the research conducted under the label applied ontology, a well-known 
approach is the so-called ontological realism [19]. The main instrument of ontological real-
ism, largely applied in the information systems realm, is BFO. As a top-level ontology, BFO 
intends to define the most generic categories and provides means of categorizing entities in 
a domain to be represented. BFO has a large acceptance in medicine, biology, bioinformatics, 
and related fields.
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2.2. Formal ontology and levels of BFO
Defining “formal ontology” is not a simple endeavor. Ref. [20], for example, dedicates a full 
chapter in trying to accomplish such a task. There are, certainly, several good definitions in 
the literature, but we do not discuss the merits of each one here. For the sake of simplicity, 
we adopt the notion of formal ontology as the set of terms specified in logical statements and 
applied to represent the reality in a domain. In this sense, BFO can be called a top-level formal 
ontology. In the remaining part of the section, we describe the BFO’s levels.
BFO is comprised by some levels of well-characterized kinds of entities. We do not describe all 
levels here, but just that one required to understand the essentials of BFO, which is adopted as 
the starting point of our investigation. A full account of BFO can be found in Ref. [21]. Several 
examples presented here are due to Ref. [22]. All levels and categories mentioned are depicted 
in Figure 1.
BFO’s first level has the general designation of “entity.” The second level (below) acknowl-
edges two distinct groups of entities. On the one hand, it considers substantial entities called 
continuants; on the other hand, it considers processual entities called occurrents. Continuants 
endure over time while maintaining their identity. Examples of continuants are a person, 
a fruit, an orchestra, and a law. Occurrents happen, unfold, and develop through time. 
Examples of occurrents are the respiration and the functioning of a body organ, a part of 
your life.
Listed under continuants, BFO’s third level contains three categories: (i) independent continuants, 
(ii) specifically dependent continuants, and (iii) generically dependent continuants. Independent con-
tinuants are bearers of qualities, that is, there are qualities that inhere in them, for example, the 
red color that inheres in a tomato. Specifically dependent continuants are entities that depend 
on one or more specific independent continuants for their existence, for example, the pain in my 
Figure 1. BFO top-level ontology, its levels, and its categories. Source: [21].
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head depends on me, the disposition of fruits to decay depends on fruits, and the role of a pro-
fessor in a university depends on a person. Generically dependent continuants are entities that 
also depend on independent continuants, but in contrast to specifically dependent continuants, 
the instance that works as bearer can undergo changes over time. One example is the Odyssey 
by Homers that has many bound copies.
Under occurrents, BFO’s third level contains four categories: (i) processes, (ii) process boundar-
ies, (iii) temporal regions, and (iv) spatial temporal regions. Processes are entities that unfold in 
time, have temporal parts, and always maintain a relationship of participation with inde-
pendent continuants. Examples are the process of digestion, the course of a disease, and the 
flight of a plane. Process boundaries, temporal regions, and spatiotemporal regions are not 
described since they are not important for our purposes.
BFO’s fourth level of continuants contains important categories, such as (i) material entities, for 
example, objects and aggregates; examples of objects are an apple and a mountain; examples 
of aggregates are an orchestra and a pile of stones; (ii) qualities are properties of entities, for 
example, the color or the smell of something; and (iii) realizable entities are entities whose 
instances contain periods of actualization in the course of their existence, for example, the 
role of antibiotics in healing a disease and the disposition of people to grow. The fourth level 
of occurrents also contains categories for representing the world, such as processes profile and 
temporal regions.
2.3. Essentials of mereology and granular partitions
A variety of formal frameworks is available for creating and testing ontological developments. 
Indeed, one can count with a range of theories deriving from the advances of formal logic and 
set theory in terms of which ontologies can be formulated. These theories allow ontologists to 
both express intuitive principles in a rigorous way and test ontologies developed for consis-
tency and completeness [13].
One can argue why it would be required to resort to theories that deal with parts and wholes 
to explain corporations. As we will see later in this chapter (Section 4), one can benefit from 
employing these aforementioned theories in describing the descriptive dimension of corpo-
rations, which involves units, subunits, and members. Two well-known of these theories—
mereology and Theory of Granular Partitions—are explained in the remaining part of this section 
(respectively, in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2).
2.3.1. Mereological principles
Mereology is a theory that deals with the relations of parts to the whole and the relations of 
part to part within a whole, from a formal point of view. There are two main groups of prin-
ciples one can use to explain these relations between parts and wholes: principles of decompo-
sition, which take one from a whole to its parts, and principles of composition, which take one 
from the parts to the whole. These principles, in addition to some basic notions, give rise to 
the core of mereological theories. All introductory notions presented in this section are based 
mainly on Refs. [23, 24].
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A single part of relation between two elements—x is part of y—has the mathematical properties 
of reflexivity, transitivity, and asymmetry [25]. An example of reflexivity is John resembles himself; 
an example of transitivity is if John is in front of Harry and Harry is in front of Bill, then John is 
also in front of Bill; an example of symmetry is if John is married to Mary, Mary is married to John.
These properties capture some intuitions what people have regarding the aforementioned 
properties and the part-whole relation. The reflexivity property means that everything is part 
of itself; the transitivity property means that any part of any part of a thing is itself part of that 
thing; the asymmetry property means two distinct things cannot be part of each other. These 
notions compose what is usually called basic mereology. It is the common basis for any part-
whole theory, but other properties can be added to this basic framework, like equality, proper 
part, overlap, and underlap.
The first extension to the basic mereology is called extensional mereology. It involves the so-called 
decomposition principles: principles that take one from a whole to its parts. The intuitive 
notion behind decomposition is that whenever something has a proper part (a part that does 
not correspond to the whole), it actually has more than one. In other words, nothing can have 
a single proper part, which implies the existence of a remainder between a whole and its 
proper parts (mereological difference) in any process of the decomposition.
There is more than one possibility to capture the intuition behind the mereological differ-
ence. One possibility is called supplementation, a principle holding that every proper part of a 
whole must be supplemented by another part, which is disjointed from the first one. There is a 
slightly different version of this principle known as strong supplementation, which corresponds 
to the idea that if an object fails to include another one among its parts, then there must be a 
remainder. The strong principle of supplementation gives rise to a property named extension-
ality, which ensures that entities are completely defined by their parts and that no composite 
objects with the same proper parts can be distinguished.
Finally, the so-called classical mereology involves composition principles, which are principles 
that take one from the parts to the whole. The notion behind composition is that whenever 
there are things, there exists a whole that is formed exactly by those things. This means that 
there is a unique sum for arbitrary entities. The uniqueness is guaranteed by the property of 
extensionality, implied by the principle of supplementation in the scope of the extensional 
mereology. The existence of this sum implies that there is always a fusion between two or 
more parts, called mereological sum.
There is more than one possibility to capture the notion behind the mereological sum, namely, 
the upper bound and the sum. The upper bound of two objects is another object of which both the 
original ones are parts. The sum is a mereological upper bound of which any part overlaps one 
of the two individuals summed [26]. In other words, a mereological sum between two objects 
must be something composed exactly of their parts and nothing else.
2.3.2. Granular Partition Theory principles
Granular partitions are a name for cognitive devices that people can employ to label, list, 
sort, or catalog activities performed by other people. Examples of granular partitions are lists, 
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hierarchies, classifications, and so forth. Ref. [27] introduced the notion of granular partitions 
corresponding to a generalization of the concept of classes as mereological sums originated in 
set theory. All principles presented in this section are based on Ref. [25].
As mentioned, there are several kinds of partitions, and all of them consider the existence of 
objects. In the context of granular partitions, an object is everything existent that can be recog-
nized by some units of partition. Objects can be either bona fide objects or fiat objects: while the 
former exists independently of human partitioning or demarcating activities, the latter exists 
only because of the very same activities. Indeed, partition units can recognize fiat objects 
from limits based on human cognition, and fiat objects are created through the projection of 
partitions in a portion of reality [28]. This distinction is very relevant for the purposes of this 
chapter, as we will make clear ahead (Section 4).
A formal Theory of Granular Partitions is composed by two different theories: Theory A 
reflects that partition units can recognize fiat objects based on human cognition and Theory 
B explains how fiat objects are created through the projection of partitions in reality. These 
two theories (Figure 2) are the mereological counterparts of set theory: Theory A is the coun-
terpart of the relations between sets and subsets; Theory B is the counterpart of relations 
between a set and its member.
Theory A is a theory for formation of partitions. A partition can have units and subunits, also 
called, respectively, cells or subcells. A unit is defined by its position within a partition and by 
its relations to other units, for example, the relation between the class of fruits and the class 
of food. Conversely, Theory B is the theory between partitions and reality, for example, the 
relation between the fruit partition and fruits in reality.
Units in partitions can be nested one inside another constituting what is called subunit. 
The unit-subunit relation has several mathematical properties that are not important for our 
purposes here. Relevant, nonetheless, is its property of transitivity, which allows the for-
mation of chains of units structured in a way that a maximal unit encompasses all the other 
Figure 2. Theory of Granular Partitions. Source: adapted from Ref. [25].
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 existent subunits until to reach a minimal unit. So, if two units of a partition overlap, then one 
is subunit of the other.
Theory B involves the projection of partitions in reality and location of objects in the parti-
tion. Projection is then a relation, which is successful if an object on which a unit is projected 
is located in that unit. So, the result of a successful projection has a location as a result in two 
directions: from the mind to the world and from the world to the mind. Ref. [25] makes this 
point clear through an example:
“Projection is like the relation which holds between your shopping list and the items which, if your 
shopping trip is successful, you will actually buy. Location is like the relation which obtains between 
the items you have bought and the new list your mother makes after your return, as she checks off those 
items which you have in fact succeeded in bringing back with you.”
2.4. Essentials of s-acts, d-acts, mental states, and intentionality
In order to reach the aforementioned descriptive and normative analysis, we need to approach 
notions of some relevant related subjects, namely, social acts, based on the work of Reinach1; 
mental acts, speech acts, intentionality, and document acts, mainly based on Searle [29–34].
The theories that try to explain people’s acts—spoken or written—as well as results of these 
acts were first advanced by Reinach. Reinach’s theory, based on ideas of Husserl’s2 phe-
nomenology, suggested the existence of an a priori law containing juridical concepts free of 
human interpretation and intellectually self-evident. In this effort of establishing the grounds 
of a theory independent of the positive law, the spontaneous acts were an important concept 
defined as the set of experiences a person could have in which the very same person has an 
active participation.
Some experiences require the existence of a subject for reference. Reinach called them non-
self-directable. Such experiences involve acts that, in addition to refer to another subject, have 
to be perceived by the very same subject. Acts that need to be perceived are then called social 
acts, actually acts with intentional roots. Speech acts and document acts, which are relevant 
for the goals of this chapter, were developed from the social acts theory.
Mental states are another fundamental concept that needs some clarifications, since it contrib-
utes to the understanding of speech acts and intentionality (explained later in this section). 
Mental states are phenomena approached in Neuroscience and Philosophy of Mind.
In Philosophy of Mind, for example, Ref. [32] furnishes a view that avoids the mind-body 
dualism. In such view, one can realize an attempt to harmonize the mechanistic and the mate-
rialist accounts of the functioning of mind. In addition, this attempt includes an explanation 
of both subjective and intentional aspects of the human consciousness without to ignore the 
qualia—what constitutes the experience of to be conscious—of the mental experiences pos-
sessed and known by people.
1Adolf Bernhard Philipp Reinach, 1883–1917, German philosopher, jurist and law theorist
2Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl, 1859–1938, German philosopher and mathematician
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Such approach to mental phenomena guides one to an account of Philosophy of Language 
regarded as a branch of Philosophy of Mind [32]. The structural similarity between mind 
and language impacts in Searle’s approach to speech acts, one of the most known and 
 well-founded contemporary theories.
“It should not seem at all surprising to us that the structure of linguistic acts and the structure of 
mental states should be similar, because one of the chief functions of language is to express our thoughts 
and feelings, and even when we are performing speech acts […].” [32]
The Theory of Speech Acts was originally proposed by Austin3 and conceived as a method to 
analyze philosophical questions. The analysis departed from the examination of language as 
a way to perform acts through words. Speech Acts Theory proposes that the elementary units 
to use and to understand natural language are speech acts. A speech act is the basic unit of 
meaning, constituted by three connected dimensions: locutionary acts, illocutionary acts, and 
perlocutionary acts.
The locutionary act corresponds to the linguistic dimension, which considers sentences 
endowed with both meaning and reference and employed according to grammatical rules. 
The illocutionary act, which is the core of the speech act, keeps as a fundamental aspect called 
illocutionary force. This force, which consists of the performative acts itself, represents the kind 
of act performed. For example, in the proposition “I promise to pay you tomorrow,” there 
is an utterance (verb “promise”) that constitutes the own act of promising and does not rep-
resent any description of intentions or of mental states. When a person utters the sentence, 
the promise is concretized, that is, the force that characterizes the act is the promise.
Searle [30] develops a classification of speech acts, in substitution of the initial proposal of 
Austin, which presents the following kinds of acts: assertive, commissive, directive, declarative, 
and expressive. In addition, seven components of illocutionary force are defined. Then, the 
result of a speech act is the combination three factors: (i) a proposition, which can be true or 
false; (ii) the semantic content related to the facts of the world; and (iii) the illocutionary force 
added to the proposition.
One issue regarding the speech acts is its evanescence, a result of its inherent orality. This 
makes the range of acting of a speech act temporally constrained. Smith [34] tries to approach 
this issue through the Theory of Document Acts. Indeed, a speech act exists only in the moment 
of its performance; documents, on the other hand, are continuant entities able to persist in 
time while absorbing modifications through its history.
In small communities, promises and obligations can be established through speech acts, but 
such compromises cannot be maintained in large and multi-faceted societies. Promises and 
obligations transcend the local character of personal contacts, since the psychological facts 
that could guarantee the fulfillment of a promise, mainly based on human memories, are not 
enough in large communities. On the other hand, documents maintain its identity through 
the time, and one can manipulate it in archiving, destroying, signing, registering, inspecting, 
or transferring it. Then, documents made possible new and persistent kinds of relations and 
3John Langshaw Austin, 1911–1960, British philosopher of language
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social entities that work as extensions of our memories. Documents do not only register infor-
mation, but they can also be used to create a variety of social and institutional powers, which 
in turn allow the establishment of ways of life in society.
The last concept to be introduced here, which is relevant for the purposes of our goals in 
this chapter, is intentionality. It is a philosophical concept that traces back the medieval scho-
lastics and was retrieved by Brentano,4 employed to define a statute for the fact that human 
conscience is directed to something or is about something. The term was also later employed 
by Husserl, who advocated the idea that consciousness is always intentional. Indeed, the 
intentionality distinguishes a property of mental phenomena, namely, the property of being 
directed to an object, real or imaginary.
Nowadays, a very accepted account of intentionality is due to Ref. [31]. In such account 
statements can be bearers of meaning. The performance of an illocutionary act necessarily 
specifies a mental state of who utters it, since illocutionary acts exhibit satisfaction condi-
tions identical to the respective mental states. The performance of illocutionary acts depends 
on the ability of the human cognition in specify intentional mental states associated to the 
very same illocutionary acts and in assigning to latter the same satisfaction conditions of 
the former.
3. The nature of corporations
There are several theories and doctrines about the nature of corporations in scientific fields 
like History, Politics, Moral and Ethics, Philosophy, Metaphysics, and Theology, to mention 
but a few. This section focuses on doctrines originated in two scientific fields—law and eco-
nomics—which, in general, have been taken as authoritative in defining and explaining the 
nature of corporations.
3.1. The nature of organization in law theories
In the scope of law, there has been a lot of discussion about the nature of corporations since 
the ninth century. Indeed, the corporation is a product of Roman civil law, and Ancient Rome 
had already perfected the notion of corporation to include all legal attributes one can see in 
modern corporations today [35].
Pope Innocent IV5 promulgated a theory about “corporate bodies.” The idea that corporations 
are personae  citae (fictitious persons) was firstly directed to ecclesiastical institutions. Indeed, 
since these kind of institution did not have body of soul, they could not be punished or excom-
municated. The doctrine suggested that being a person was denied to civil groups because of 
the dominant conception of a person. Such conception was due to St. Thomas Aquinas and 
took one back to metaphysical discussions of Aristotle about the nature of substance [36].
4Franz Clemens Honoratus Hermann Brentano, 1838–1917, German philosopher
5Innocent IV, 1195–1254, Pope from 1243 to 1254
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A substantial understanding of the legal nature of corporation had already existed when the 
English Crown began to charter the first business corporations in the fifteenth century. The 
first jurists to formally establish what a corporation is and what are its legal attributes were 
Sir Edward Coke, author of the treatise The Law of Corporation, from 1702, and later both Sir 
Willian Blackstone—author of Commentaries on the Law, from 1765—and Steward Kyd, author 
of Corporation, from 1793 [37].
These pioneering jurists, although bearing in mind ecclesiastical bodies, described the corpo-
ration in a form that also applies to current business corporations. A corporation would be a 
legal unit with its own legal rights and responsibilities; it is distinct from the individuals who 
are members constituting it over time; it is a creation of law and could achieve legal status by 
an act of the state.
These core attributes assigned to corporations in England were borrowed by American jurists 
and applied in America, where a corporation possessed some legal attributes: it could con-
tract, sue, and be sued; it could acquire and dispose property; it has its own seal by which it 
could act as a body distinct from its members; its shares are transferable; its membership may 
change without affecting its perpetual existence; it cannot commit assault or treason; and it 
cannot serve as a trustee [38].
The classical formulation of these attributes has come to known as the “artificial person” doc-
trine of the corporation. This is one of the several doctrines and theories that arose trying to 
understand the notion of “corporate personality.” Such a notion was needed to explain what 
would be the essence of this soulless and bodiless person. The orthodox doctrine of corporate 
personality considered that corporations are intangible legal entities. Thus, as a legal person, 
a corporation has a personality separated from the personality of the members that compose 
the very corporation.
In Anglo-American world, the orthodox statement was widespread. For example, law in 
United States6 maintains that a corporation must be treated as a person. This extension of rights 
and obligations from a natural person to a corporation comes from the interpretation of the 
word “person” in the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in countries like France, Germany, 
and Italy, there was a great debate and different theories arose [39]: Fiction Theory, Concession 
Theory, Group Personality Theory or Realist Sociological Theory, The Bracket Theory or Symbolist 
Theory, Purpose Theory or Theory of Zweck Vermogen, Hohfeld’s Theory, and Kelsen’s Theory.
The so-called Fiction Theory—first advanced by Savigny7—debated who would be the real 
owner of a property considering that property, in law, can belong to a corporation. The solu-
tion was the creation of a sort of fictitious person, which is the owner of the corporate property. 
The corporation would be a creation of law having no existence apart from its individual 
members, who form the corporate group and whose acts are attributed to the corporate 
entity. In this context, the personality of a corporation would be different from that one of 
its members, and any change in membership does not affect the existence of the corporation. 
6US Code: Title 1,1. Words denoting number, gender, and so forth. Legal Information Institute (LII)
7Friedrich Carl von Savigny, 1779–1861, German jurist and historian
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The property of a corporation is not the same property of its members, since a corporation can 
go bankrupt, while its members remain rich.
Concession Theory—advanced by Savigny, Dicey8, and Salmond9—is often mentioned as being 
part of Fiction Theory, but it has a different origin and rests on different interests. Actually, 
it is a product of a centralized model of national state that started to compete with the power 
of religious congregations and feudal organizations. Concession and Fiction Theories assert 
that corporations have no legal personality. However, while Fiction Theory is ultimately a 
Philosophical Theory suggesting that a corporation is a thing of the intellect, the concession 
theory focuses on the source of its legal power. Indeed, Concession Theory is indifferent to 
questions of reality and states that a juridical person is merely a concession of a national state.
Real Entity Theory, also called Group Theory and Realist Sociological Theory, was advanced 
mainly by Althusius10 and Gierke.11 This group of theorists focused on sociological facts and in 
the belief that collective groups (as corporations) have a real mind, a real will, and a real abil-
ity to action. Thus, a corporation would have a real existence even though it does not receive 
recognition from the state. According to this theory, the existence of a corporation is not based 
on any fiction, because it is a psychological reality. A corporation is a social organism, whose 
law has no power to create, but only to recognize.
Associational Theory, also called Bracket Theory or Symbolist Theory, was propounded by 
von Jhering12 and others, suggesting that the juristic corporate personality is only a symbol 
employed to facilitate the working of corporate bodies. On the one hand, this theory fol-
lows fictitious theory in maintaining the existence of a corporation as a fiction metaphor; 
on the other hand, it states that the corporate personality is not created by the state because 
actually it does not exist; it is solely an abbreviated form to represent several people that 
are members of the corporation. Only members of the corporation are real persons, and the 
corporation is a merely economic device by which one can simplify the task of coordinating 
legal relations.
Purpose Theory, also called the Theory of Zweck Vermogen, is a variant of the Fiction Theory cre-
ated by Bekker13 and von Brinz14 to explain the ownership in charitable corporations. It also 
considers a corporation as a fictitious entity but is focusing on the purpose of those who man-
age the property, instead of focusing on the ownership of property by an object. This theory 
asserts that only human beings could be subject matter of rights and duties. Thus, a juristic 
person is not a real person, but merely a property destined for particular purposes. As in the 
context the legal relations involving corporations, there is ownership, but no owner; a juristic 
person could not be equivalent to a group of persons. Rather, it would be based on objects 
and purposes.
8Albert Venn Dicey, 1835–1922, British jurist and constitutional theorist
9John William Salmond, 1862–1924, legal scholar, public servant and judge in New Zealand
10Johannes Althusius, 1563–1638, German jurist and Calvinist political philosopher
11Otto Friedrich von Gierke, 1841–1921, German legal scholar and historian
12Caspar Rudolph Ritter von Jhering, 1818–1892, German jurist
13Ernst Immanuel Bekker, 1827–1916, German jurist and professor
14Alois Ritter von Brinz, 1820–1887, German jurist and politician
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There are also complementary theories of legal personality, like Hohfeld’s15 Theory and 
Kelsen’s16 Theory. The former declares that juristic persons are creations of arbitrary pro-
cedures. Human beings alone are capable of having both rights and duties, and when 
the law ascribes juristic personality to any group, it makes this merely as a procedure 
for dealing with legal rights. The latter said that there is no difference between the legal 
corporate personality and the individual personality. Indeed, the corporate personality 
would be only a technical personification of a set of norms that assign rights and duties 
to people.
3.2. The nature of the organization in economic theories
Economics and Management are research fields that maintain a special interest in de ning 
corporations insofar as they involve many aspects of the society and play a central role in 
economic analysis.
The context for evaluating the nature of corporations involves two basic entities: per-
sons and ownership. In general, if people are subjects of property rights and things are 
objects of property rights, then people own things and things are owned by people. In the 
traditional sole-proprietorship corporation, the individual capitalist is the subject of the 
property right, and the corporate assets are the object of property right. In the partnership 
corporation, a group of individuals owns the assets jointly. In order to perform activities 
and reach goals, corporations enter in several contractual relations with other parties, like 
employees, suppliers, customers, etc. Within this scenario, whenever there is a withdrawal 
or an admission of a new partner, each contract has to be rewritten. In addition, when the 
corporation grows and numerous outside relations take place, the transaction costs can be 
prohibitively high.
The corporation is then a solution for the existence of multiple transactions, insofar as a group 
of individuals in creating a corporation also create an additional person who has the same 
legal capacity to own real assets as the partners themselves have. Outside parties enter into a 
contract with this additional person, independently of the number of shareholders.
Considering that to evaluate the nature of corporations, one has to understand both persons 
and ownership relations, she can realize that corporations play a dual role: they can be a 
person and they can be a thing. The corporation (as person) owns its assets, and it is owned 
(as thing) by shareholders. In the former case, it acts legally as a person; in the latter, it acts 
legally as a thing. This duality gives rise to discussions about the origin of the corporate per-
sonality, since a corporation is in reality neither a person nor a thing, but an entity endowed 
with both personality and thingness. The fact that a corporation can be owned by persons 
means that it is not a person, unless we consider that slavery exists; the fact that it can own 
other things does not allow it to be a thing, since things cannot own other things. This can be 
considered a sort of indeterminacy, in which law is unable to determine the legal nature of a 
corporation within its own system [40].
15Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 1879–1918, American jurist
16Hans Kelsen, 1881–1973, Austrian jurist, legal philosopher and political philosopher
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Despite controversies, these theories bear a resemblance to aforementioned legal theories of 
corporate personality. Differently from legal theories, the modern theories in Economics and 
Management fields aim to explain the economic behavior.
Some theories consider two different mechanisms within the economy: the price system, 
which could not explain all the economic behavior, let alone the decisions taken within a cor-
poration, and the hierarchy employed in corporations to allocate and reallocate resources. So, 
to delimit a corporation within the market, one should consider two kinds of relations: those 
internal to the corporation, namely, authority relations, and those external, namely, contract 
relations [41]. This theory, known as the Evolutionary Theory, has several representatives, for 
example, Refs. [42–44]. There are evidences that these theories are descendants of the already 
mentioned Real Entity Theory. Winter Sidney and Nelson [43] say that organizations know 
how to do things, and individuals can come and go. This seems very close to the premises of 
Real Entity Theory, in which corporations exist as real persons, as social organisms have a real 
will that enable them to decide how to do things.
Other theories propose that there is only one mechanism at work in modern economy, 
namely, the price mechanism. A theory like this is the so-called Contractual Theory of the 
Firm [45], which also has different considerations about the form of delimiting the corpora-
tion within the market. It considers that the limits of a corporation are more permeable than 
one can think and that the distinction between the corporation and the market is not so clear. 
According to this kind of theory, corporations are really another type of market: they are legal 
fictions that serve as links between contracting relationships representing individuals. Several 
authors represent this slant, for example, Refs. [46–48]. There are evidences that these theories 
are descendants of the already mentioned Associational Theory. Ref. [45], for example, says that 
corporations are legal fictions which serve as a connection for contracting relations among 
individuals. This seems similar to the premises of the Associational Theory, in which there is 
no corporation, but just legal relations among groups of individuals.
3.3. Issues in Law and Economic Theories
After presenting a diversity of theories about the nature of corporation and about a so-called 
corporate personality, one can ask why additional analysis would be required. The answer 
is that all corporate theories presented so far, despite their historical and social importance, 
contain issues that do not make them eligible as the best candidates to an account for repre-
senting corporations.
Fiction Theory, for example, lies on the notion that corporations can own property, but cor-
porations do not have will, and then the solution is to create a fictitious person. Likewise, a 
corporation is distinct from the sum of its members, that is, the corporate ownership is a non-
summative collection. Indeed, for example, a school can preserve its identity independently 
of the different generations of students that left it behind.
We can organize the issues of Fiction Theory in three main contradictions [49]: (i) if one 
accepts that corporate ownership is non-summative and accepts that ownership involves the 
possession of will by the owner, then she is committed to the fact that corporations have will, 
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which contradicts one of the main statements of the theory; (ii) if one accepts that corporate 
ownership is non-summative and accepts that a corporation does not possess will, she must 
deny that ownership involves the possession of will by the owner; and (iii) if one accepts that 
ownership involves the possession of will by the owner and accepts that a corporation does 
not possess a will, then she must reject even the idea that the corporate ownership exists.
Real Entity Theory, as described before, suggests that corporations are organisms that possess 
real will and senses as natural persons. Naturally, it would be difficult to prove that a corpora-
tion is a real person. For example, a corporation can neither marry nor be given in marriage 
as a natural person. Actually, a corporation is not a rational being, it is not capable of under-
standing commands of law, and it has no will. In expressing commands to a corporation, law 
is speaking to the human beings that compose it [39].
Associational Theory, basically, advocates that the corporation is just a group of individuals, 
not an entity. This does not seem to be true: a company that has 100 years is not identical 
to its members. IBM, for example, is not a succession of entities in which every change in 
membership results in a cessation of one corporate entity and the creation of a new one. Also, 
“the Ford Motor Company today is very different from the same company of 1970, yet many 
essential characteristics remain so that Ford is still Ford, for better or worse” [50].
Finally, Economic Theories already presented just seek to describe and explain the eco-
nomic behavior. There is no ontological debate about the kinds of entities that could exist in 
social reality.
4. Ontological analysis of the corporations
Despite the issues of Law and Economic Theories in explaining the nature of corporations, 
they gather several characteristics of a corporation as we currently know it. From what we 
have presented so far about such theories, one can sketch some hypothetical features to the 
corporation: (i) corporations maintain their identity over time; (ii) corporations have real exis-
tence separated from their members; (iii) corporations are artificial (or fiat) entities; (iv) corpo-
rations are non-summative aggregates; and (v) corporations are long-lasting entities.
In this section, we check these hypotheses by providing an ontological analysis, which reveals 
the multitude of entities, both natural and social, that compose a corporation: the corporation 
itself and its parts; entities that correspond to the several roles that a corporation can play, for 
example, plaintiff, property owner, taxpayer, etc.; and entities that correspond to the several 
events in which a corporation can participate, for example, paying taxes, selling or buying, 
auditing, etc.
We make use of the formal ontology machinery—mainly Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) and some 
theories presented before as background—in trying to describe the structure of a corporation 
according to two dimensions, namely, a descriptive and a normative. On one hand, a descriptive 
(or scientific) statement is true or false; it is not a command; on the other hand, a prescriptive 
(or normative) statement is concerned to which has to be done or not; it is about how to comply 
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[51]. In our approach, the descriptive dimension accounts the way in which a corporation is 
organized in units and subunits (Section 4.2); and the normative dimension accounts the way in 
which social entities—duties and obligations—can be handled within a corporation (Section 4.3).
4.1. The structure of the organization I: units and subunits
As BFO conveys transcategorial entities to be represented in information systems, we try to 
check which of its entities can account corporations or parts of corporations. In doing this, we 
try to answer the question (in the ontological sense): what kind of entity is a corporation? In 
this section, we discuss the descriptive dimension of the corporation, namely, that one which 
describes units and subunits, as well as the roles that compose them. The strategy is assum-
ing the corporation and its entities as entities of BFO and then verifies the correctness of that 
assumption.
Considering the second level of BFO, our first verification is as follows: are corporations inde-
pendent continuants? According to BFO, independent continuants are entities which change 
over time while retaining something of their identity [18]. Independent continuants are BFO’s 
representatives of Aristotelian substances, which are characterized by the following: (i) sub-
stances exist on their own and do not require a support from other substances in order to exist; 
(ii) substances remain numerically one and the same, as well as can admit accidents at differ-
ent times; (iii) substances are able to stand in causal relations; (iv) substances are “one by a pro-
cess of nature”; and (v) substances have no proper parts which are themselves substances [52].
What about corporations? What of such features they possess? So, corporations do not 
depend on other entities unless constitutive entities; they remain numerically one and the 
same;  corporations can only indirectly stand in causal relations through their members; they 
do not exist by a natural process; they are composed by substances, which are their members. 
As one can notice, corporations have in common with Aristotelian substances only the two 
first characteristics just mentioned. Thus, corporations are not exactly Aristotelian substances, 
but they have the marks of independent continuants insofar as at any given time, all of its 
parts are present, and its existence does not depend on any other discrete entities.
What kind of whole a corporation would be? We can divide this question in three parts: (i) are 
corporations summative wholes? (ii) Are corporations integral wholes? or (iii) Are corpora-
tions aggregate wholes?
Summative wholes are exhaustively defined by their constituent parts, and according to the 
principle of mereological extensionality, objects with the same parts are equal. However, 
this notion does not conform to the intuitive notion we have in which corporations can pre-
serve identity even undergoing changes in membership. So, corporations are not summative 
wholes. Integral wholes, on the other hand, have strong structural connections among their 
parts, differently of corporations, which are not maximally connected, for example, organ-
isms. Finally, in opposite of sums, aggregates are not defined in terms of their own elements. 
Otherwise, they have detached parts that integral wholes do not have. As corporations have 
members linked together (persons, units, for example), one can acknowledge that corpora-
tions are kinds of aggregates: they are material entities consisting exactly of a plurality of 
objects, and these objects are member parts of it all times at which it exists.
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To start a way of representing the corporation and entities that compose it as BFO’s entities, 
we seek inspiration in Popper’s Theory of Three Worlds [53]. In this kind of representation 
based on levels, we can correspond corporations (and other entities) in reality to BFO’s aggre-
gates, as depicted in Figure 3. The first level is the reality level; the second level (above the first 
one) corresponds to people’s cognition, in which people perceive and model reality; and the 
third level is the level of representations concretized from the cognitive models. In Figure 3, 
examples of entities in reality—Ford, IBM, John, NYC, etc.—are modeled and then concret-
ized as representations in the third level, in this case, in BFO. Then, for example, Ford Motor 
Company is an instance of object aggregate, which is a BFO’s transcategorial entity.
One can argue why it would be useful to represent Ford Motor Company as an aggregate. In 
the subsequent analysis, we hope the usefulness of this procedure becomes clear. For now, we 
inquire: how to divide the corporation in units and subunits? In order to answer, we make use 
of background theories presented in Section 2: mereology and granular partitions.
Mereology, despite to contain several relevant principles, deals with material entities and does 
not seem to be the best framework to explain corporations and its units because of several issues. 
It is hard to believe that the relation between a corporation and its members is a part-whole rela-
tion; insofar as in mereology, the part-whole relation is transitive. Accordingly, one might say 
inconsistent statements, for example, if John is part of a corporation, any part of John, as his eyes 
or his mouth, is also part of the corporation. In addition, mereology cannot account the fact that 
a corporation preserves its identity over time even when it loses or gains members [49].
The Granular Partitions Theory, on the contrary, uses cognitive devices to show how peo-
ple divide the world. It relies on the distinction between bona fide objects and fiat objects, 
as  mentioned before: bona fide objects exist independently of human subdividing activity; 
and fiat objects exist only because of the very same subdividing activity. Using the Granular 
Partitions Theory—namely, Theory A—one can define units, subunits (or cells and subcells), 
as well as the relation between unit and subunit (or cell and subcell). The application of 
Theory A to corporations is illustrated in Figure 4: there is a certain car company partitioned 
into two subcells, “the human resources department” and “the board of directors.”
Figure 3. Levels from reality to BFO. Source: [49].
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Likewise, using the Granular Partitions Theory—namely, Theory B—one can define the pro-
jection relation, which holds from a cell to the reality, and the location relation, which holds 
from an object to a cell. The application of Theory B to corporations is illustrated in Figure 5: 
there is a certain car company partitioned into two subcells, “the human resources depart-
ment” and “the board of directors.” In addition, “John” in reality projects onto the “John cell” 
within the corporation, as well as “John cell” is located in “John” in reality. We also can say 
that “the human resources department” is a cell within the corporation, but the minimum cell 
is “John cell.” The same relations hold for “Mary.”
After applying the Granular Partitions Theory to the corporation, we are ready to make another 
attempt following our proposal of characterizing corporate entities. If the corporation can be con-
sidered a maximal cell, a cell which every other cell is subcell, then corporate units are cells and 
subcells. Thus, one can consider that units and subunits can be considered fiat object parts. A fiat 
object is another BFO’s transcategorial entity. Figure 6, similarly to Figure 3, presents three levels: 
the first level is the reality; and above the second level (of cognition), we draw two other represen-
tation levels—a level concretized in a Granular Partition Model and a level concretized in BFO.
Figure 5. Theory B representing the structure of a corporation. Source: [49].
Figure 4. Theory A representing the structure of a corporation. Source: [49].
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So, finally, as we suggested before, the corporation is a kind of aggregate. However, either 
a colony of ants or a swarm of bees also are aggregates. What is the difference between an 
“aggregate corporation” and other kinds of aggregates? What distinguishes a corporation 
from a colony of ants? To answer this question, we need to approach the normative dimension 
of the corporation.
4.2. The structure of the organization: duties, obligations, and responsibilities
As mentioned before, a corporation can be analyzed from two main dimensions. In the prior 
section (Section 4.1), we tried to approach the descriptive dimension of the corporation. At the 
present section, we cover the normative dimension in seeking to explain what distinguishes 
a corporation from other aggregates. As one can realize, unlike colonies of ants and other 
aggregates, corporations have normative partitions.
We begin by explaining how units and subunits are assigned with duties and obligations. So, 
according to Granular Partitions Theory, a successful projection lies on the side of the reality. 
For example, considering an architectural blueprint, the reality should match the blueprint 
by constructing something. Likewise, a corporation should match, for example, a statute of 
the company and its strategic plan, as well as other documents related to its creation and 
functioning.
If corporate units may be fiat objects, as stated in Section 4.1, one can argue: how a fiat object 
comes to existence? In this case, the answer is simple: a fiat object comes to existence through 
the cognition. A person can create a mental partition, which, for example, delimits a corporate 
unit. After all, more important is asking how a fiat object is sustained in existence, because 
corporations are long-lasting entities. So, a fiat object is sustained when the verbal form of 
corporate norms is translated to a written form. Here, we are approaching the realm of the 
social ontology: to explain the verbal form, we use the Theory of Speech Acts [14, 54]; to explain 
Figure 6. Levels from reality to partitions and partitions to BFO. Source: [49].
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the written form, which records the speech acts, we use the Theory of Document Acts [34]. 
In  addition, we use the notion of social acts [55].
A social act is a kind of act that needs to be perceived by someone [55]. A special type of 
social act, which is relevant for our purposes here, is the declaration. Declarations express what 
ought to be, for example, a promise is a declaration of how things ought to be. Declarations 
can either create or demolish reality: a promise creates both an obligation to a person and 
a claim to another person; but a declaration can also revoke some order or obligation. We 
use the document acts theory to record the cause of claims and obligations. Indeed, docu-
mentation of the cause for claims and obligations is one of the driving forces in the creation 
of documents. Then, we reach a kind of “social partition” in which people perform social 
acts in filling appropriate paperwork and approving it with appropriate authorities. Ref. [34] 
explains the connection among the three theories:
“[…] a theory of document acts supplementing the traditional Reinach-Austin-Searle theory of speech 
acts with an account of the ways in which, by doing things with documents […] we are able to change 
the world by bringing into being new types of ownership relations, of legal accountability, of business 
organizations, and […]”
The document acts theory, which is crucial to represent long-lasting duties, obligations, and 
responsibilities within a corporation, can be related to BFO through the Document Acts (d-acts) 
Ontology [56]. D-acts Ontology contains Social Generically Dependent Continuants (SGDCs). D-acts 
are kinds of SGDCs. SGDCs are kinds of Generically Dependent Continuants (GDCs), which are 
representative of social entities. GDCs, as we know, are kinds of BFO’s transcategorial entity.
D-acts Ontology incorporates the aforementioned kinds of acts presented in the Document 
Acts Theory: social acts, declarations, and document acts. A social act, as Reinach’s definition 
posed, is a process carried out by someone and directed toward another one, who perceives 
it; a declaration is a social act that brings about, transfers, or revokes a SGDCs; and a document 
act is a declaration made using a document in order to temporally extend the effects of the 
declaration.
Examples of the relation between document acts and SGDCs in d-acts ontology are as fol-
lows: (i) a document act can create a SGDC, for example, when John claims a piece of land; 
a document act can transfer a SGDC, for example, when John transfers his claim to Mary; and 
a document act can revoke a SGDC, for example, when a judge signs divorce papers filled in 
by a couple. In addition, d-acts ontology maintains specific roles and bearers: the creator of 
the document is called document act template creator role; the user of the document is called 
declaration performer role, and the target bearer of the SGDC is called declaration target. Figure 7 
presents the scheme of d-acts ontology and its relations to BFO.
A full example illustrates the operation of d-acts ontology: a fictitious case of recruitment in 
a corporation. A director signing and stamping an official memorandum to recruit a janitor 
is a document act; the official memorandum from the board of directors legally enables the 
recruitment process; a memorandum is the specified input of the document act of the direc-
tor’s order to recruit the janitor; the human resources manager responsible for the recruitment 
process is the bearer of the document act template creator role; the director is the bearer of the 
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declaration performer role; a human resources employee responsible for the recruitment proce-
dures is the declaration target, which becomes endowed with the right to perform procedures 
enabling the recruitment.
Finally, we present Figure 8, which is similar prior to Figures 3 and 6, containing the represen-
tation levels: the first level continues to represent the reality; the second level is now concret-
ized in a d-acts Ontology model; the third level is a representation also concretized in BFO.
Figure 7. Classes of BFO (prefix :bfo), classes of IAO (prefix: iao) and classes of d-acts (without prefix) connected. Source: 
adapted from [57].
Figure 8. Levels from reality to d-acts and from d-acts to BFO. Source: [49].
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5. Discussion
The normative dimension of analysis presented before (Section 4) seems to allow interesting 
possibilities for discussion, since processes, orders, tasks, nominations, obligations, recruit-
ment and dismiss, as well as several other corporate-related activities occur through formal 
acts conveyed first, in the form of speech acts, and then recorded in the form of document 
acts. As our research is under way, at this moment we raise some speculations that admit-
tedly need to be scientifically proved in future works. One speculation regards the relevance 
of corporative documents and respective document acts for charactering corporations and 
kinds of corporations.
We believe one can characterize the kind of corporation through both the documents that 
serve as inputs to document acts and the kinds of the very same document acts. We survey 
some theoretical evidences, coming from philosophers and researchers, for our premise that 
corporations are distinguished by documents they produce and use.
Brochhausen et al. [57] say that practices and resources regarded to both record production 
and record keeping reveal how one does organization within a corporation. The way one 
structure records imposes certain kinds of administration to workers and eventually creates 
indexes of how the corporation is managed. Indeed, “records are the information base of the 
modern state and of the modern organization” [57], since they are both the means and the 
results of a continuous process of notation, summarization, and information dissemination 
that aims to construct a depiction of what happens in the corporate environment.
Ledema [58] conjectures about the ubiquity of documents in our society through an ambitious 
theory called documentality, according to which “there is nothing social outside the text” [58]. 
Undoubtedly, a marriage or a contract that was not recorded would not exist as an (social) 
object, but a mountain can easily exist without being mapped. Since nothing social exists 
 outside the text, society would be based on registration in documents, and this very act of 
registering is the condition for creating social objects. Thus, documents constitute the funda-
mental ingredient of the social world.
Ferraris [59] also places documents in an important position to explain society and social rela-
tions, for example, those ones produced and manipulated within a corporation. As the society 
became more and more complex, “the mnemonic powers of individuals have been extended 
prosthetically through documents in ways which have given rise to a variety of novel artifacts 
of social reality” [34].
So, we also say that one could identify the kind of corporation through the kinds of docu-
ment acts performed. Consider a very typical document of a specific kind of corporation, for 
example, the medical record in the context of medical and healthcare units. A medical record 
can serve [59] to support patient care in the coordination of clinical processes, to allow better 
decision-making and for the creation of demographic surveys; to fulfill external obligations 
regarding health insurance plans, reimbursements, auditing, and accreditation; to support 
administration in planning, controlling, and quality management; and to allow scientific 
research and clinical education. Our speculation is that identifying the kinds of d-acts that 
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a medical record contains or generates may provide clues to formally distinguish the medi-
cal corporation from other ones. As we mention before, such idea has to be proved, what we 
expect to do in future works.
6. Final remarks
In this chapter, we proposed the preliminary foundations of an ontological-based architec-
ture for organizing information and knowledge within corporations. We sought to clarify the 
ontological status of corporations, to understand the relations between corporate units, and 
to approach the duties within a corporation. We presented a background of formal theories 
required to understand the research and some of the main doctrines about the nature of cor-
porations. Then, we analyzed the corporation through two dimensions we called descriptive 
and normative. The descriptive dimension deals with the structure of the corporation from 
the point of view of units and subunits, while the normative dimension deals with duties 
and obligations. We conducted our research using well-founded theories, for example, formal 
ontology, speech acts, and document acts. Finally, we offered a brief discussion focused on 
the normative aspects related to document and document acts.
As our final remarks, we would like to emphasize the connection among the levels of repre-
sentation existing throughout our ontological analysis (Section 4). In Figure 9, we again dis-
play the level of reality along with two representation levels, namely, a level for partitions and 
the level for document acts. As one can realize, these two representation levels, additionally to 
describe the dimensions of analysis proposed, maintain co-relations that, once gathered, can 
offer a view of which would be an ontological-based information architecture to corporations. 
For purposes of formalization and application in the modern information systems, it is worth 
remembering that all representation levels described throughout the chapter can be mapped 
to BFO, a transcategorial formal top-level ontology.
Figure 9. Descriptive and normative dimensions of the corporation. Source: [49].
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As we have already mentioned, the relevance of such analysis rests on the need of a better 
understanding of corporations, as well as the advantages of a formal framework to be applied 
in information systems working in the context of Semantic Web. In future works, we intend to 
advance the discussion offered here and sketch an ontology-based model for medical organi-
zations, along with semiformal definitions and hierarchy.
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